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BOOK REVIEWS 
Tm~ SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw. By Roscoe Pound. The Dartmouth 
Alumni Lectures, 1921. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. 1921. Pp. 
xv, 224-
The title of this brilliant little volume might, more accurately, have been, 
"The Spirits of the Common Law," for it depicts the common law as the 
battleground of many conflicting spirits, from which a fe\v relatively per-
manent ideas and ideals have emerged triumphant. As a whole, the book 
is a pluralistic-idealistic interpretation of legal history. Idealistic, because 
Dean Pound finds that the fundamentals of the / common law have been 
shaped by ideas and ideals rather than by economic determinism or class 
struggle; he definitely rejects a purely economic interpretation of legal his-
tory, although he demands a sociological one (pp. 10-n). Pluralistic, 
because, unlike those nineteenth-century philosophers who tried to make 
legal history stand for the unfolding of a single idea-rational will (Hegel), 
popular spirit (Savigny, Puchta)-Dean Pound finds a number of ideas 
which have contributed to the spirit of the common law. 
The title is reminiscent of two other volumes, one in the eighteenth and 
one in the nineteenth century, which are of the same philosophical pedigree: 
Montesquieu's "I:Esprit des Lois" and Jhering's "Geist des romischen 
Rechts." Montesquieu's book, which antedates Comte, has been called by 
Ehrlich "the first attempt to fashion a sociology of law"; his doctrine of 
the relativity of law to geographical, ethnical and economic conditions was 
at war with the dominant law-of-nature theory of his time. Jhering, though 
usually classed as a "social-utilitarian" (Paulsen, a follower, calls it "eudae-
monism"), has contributed several important ideas to the program of the 
sociological school-among them the conception that "interests" are the 
ultimate realities back of "legal rights," the teleological or functional view-
point in solving legal problems, and the negation of the sufficiency of purely 
juristic concepts, logically applied, to satisfy the jural needs of modem 
society. These contributions Dean Pound, as a leader of the sociological 
school, gracefully acknowledges in the present volume (pp. 203-5). 
We must hasten to add, however, that the present volume does not pre-
tend to cover the ground that the other two "Spirits" do. Dean Pound's 
immediate task in the present volume is that of presenting to a well-educated 
but non-professional audience an understandable picture of our legal insti-
tutions. This object he has faithfully adhered to. Whether the well-edu-
cated layman will be able to understand the volume in print is another ques-
tion. Those who have heard Dean Pound lecture on these same topics will 
notice many slurrings of detail, many omissions of concrete illustration, 
which make his lectures vivid and comprehensible. Those who are familiar 
with the author's articles on "Sociological Jurisprudence" will miss the appa-
ratus of foot-notes in which he is wont to overwhelm the reader with the 
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wealth and variety of his citations. There is not a single foot-note in the 
present volume. Obviously, a book for laymen! 
Yet the lawyer will find many stimulative ideas crowded into these two 
hundred pages-ideas which will help him to solve the first problem at the 
office tomorrow morning, for Dean Pound has the rare virtue, for a legal 
philosopher, of always keeping his feet on the ground. Take, for instance, 
the feudal notion of "relation," which the author seems to have· rescued 
from the limbo of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. Under the feudal system, 
the relation between lord and man was one of reciprocal rights and duties 
(p. 20) which were defined by the law, once it was found that the relation 
existed. This, the author says, became the typical common-law method of 
dealing with legal problems. In the nineteenth century it was crowded 
aside by the individualistic conception of contract (legal transaction), bor-
rowed from the Roman law (modern), by which it was sought to derive 
all legal consequences of a given human relation from the manifestations 
of the wills of the parties voluntarily entering thereinto. • 
Thus, viewed as an attempt to coerce the wills of employer and employee 
into making a certain contract involving fundamental changes in their recip-
rocal rights and duties, as previously interpreted, a Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is an arbitrary and officious interference with individual liberty. 
But viewed as an exercise of the time-honored prerogative of lawmakers 
to alter and prescribe the legal incidents of the relation of master and ser-
vant in such a way as to secure weighty social as well as individual inter-
ests, such a statute is in harmony with the spirit of the common law (pp. 
29, 30). More recent still are statutes regulating the incidents of the rela-
tion of landlord and tenant, which was the basic relation of the feudal 
system (p. 22). By judicial decisions, chiefly, the relation of carrier and 
-passenger has been regulated with a minuteness of detail which no theory 
of free-willing contractors can adequately explain. The relation of parent 
and child, for centuries almost untouched by law, has recently been regu-
lated by juvenile court legislation. Thus, to a surprising degree, "relation" 
explains recent legal developments as in harmony with the spirit of the 
common law. 
The conception of a legal transaction (contract, in the broadest sense) 
"regards individuals only. In the pioneer agricultural societies of nine-
teenth-century America such a conception sufficed. In the industrial and 
urban society of today classes and groups and relations must be taken 
account of no less than. individuals" (p. JI). "Relation" is a more concrete, 
more human concept than our bloodless conception of contract, which, 
as Ehrlich has pointed out, does not describe the interest to be protected, 
but merely designates the conditions under which the claim to legal protec-
tion arises. In this respect, moreover, the "relation" of the common law 
is to be distinguished from the abstract metaphysical "jural relations" which 
Professor Kocourek (starting from Saviguy) has written about lately, and 
from the analytical "legal relations" which Professor Corbin advocates. 
The former (the "relation" of the common law) is a species of concrete 
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human association, contrasted with such legal categories as contract and 
pure tort; the latter are generic categories embracing all phases of human 
conduct having legal consequences, including contract and tort. The legal 
consequences of the one are derived from a consideration of the interests 
involved in the particular relation, by a process largely intuitive; the legal 
consequences of the other are derived by a priori reasoning from the abstract 
nature of the concept. The latter is a logical conception; the former may 
be called, for lack of a better word, a sociological conception. -
Dean Pound is not unaware of some of the disadvantages of the com-
mon-Jaw relation. In the first place, it leads to a certain narrowness in the 
field of tort-liability; the judges tend to exclude liability with undue strict-
ness where no "relation" is involved (p. 24). The passenger in the Pull-
man, for example, is entitled to the highest degree of care, but the tramp 
on the "blind baggage" is scarcely regarded as a human being. Again, the 
amplification of the incidents of a particular relation is apt to develop a 
sort of "law-of-nature," in which fanciful duties and over-refined standards 
of conduct are imposed. The fiduciary relations of equity (p. 25) have 
sometimes been over-refined. The law of mortgagor and mortgagee and of 
carrier and passenger might be drawn upon for further examples. Thirdly, 
while, as Dean Pound points out (p. 30), relation is to be distinguished 
from "status," or the capacity for legal rights and duties (infancy, cover-
ture, slavery), yet is it not conceivable that the sum-total of the disabilities 
incident to a series of relations may be but little short of those imposed by 
an inferior status? 
Of the eight essays, the one on "Puritanism and the Law" is the least 
convmcmg. Religious interpretations of legal history are apt not to be 
satisfactory, as the author realizes. At first we are told that the Puritan 
insisted upon a maximum of individual liberty, and, as a corollary thereto, 
desired a minimum of legislation (p. 46). Yet the Puri~an, both in England 
and New England, was a prolific legislator (p. 47). Dean Pound endeavors 
to reconcile these two statements by saying that the Puritans believed in 
instructio1i through legislation (p. 47), in a multitude of rules with no ade-
quate provision for carrying them into effect (p. 56). It seems too much 
to say that the "blue laws" were merely meant to be advisory. Weakness 
of law enforcement is a common American trait, not less conspicuous in 
the non-Puritan South than in Puritan New England. At all events, the 
author's indictment of Puritanism makes interesting reading. 
In "The Pioneers and the Law" Dean Pound departs from his dazzling 
manipulation of ideas to give us a sociological' interpretation of the form-
ative period of American legal history. Here are depicted with bold, sure 
strokes the social factors of the period l8oo-1860 which made for intense 
individualism in our legal and political philosophy and for certain archaic 
features in state judicial organization (pp. 121-2), for our "sporting theory" 
of judicial procedure (p. 125) and for many features of our slow and creaky 
machinery of criminal justice (p. 123). 
The ·final chapter, deceptively entitled "Legal Reason," deals with the 
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stage of legal development upon which we are now entering: the "socializa-
tion of the law," in which legal philosophy is once more to come into its 
own (p. 149). The author takes pains to assure the timid reader that "social-
ization" does not mean "socialism" (p. 195). Here we are given a taste--
but only a taste--of the methods and concrete results 0£ sociological juris-
prudence. Without attempting to define "interest" (Bentham gave it up 
nearly a century and a half ago), yet paraphrasing it carefully as "claim," 
"demand," "want," Dean Pound says, cautiously, that "at least" six groups 
of social interests may be enumerated as "involved in the existence of civil-
ized society" (p. 2o8). Thus, the author's scheme of social interests is not 
a closed system; he does not purport to have discovered (as many legal 
philosophers before him have done) all the philosophical premises or criteria 
of a legal system. 
The six groups of social interests are: l" "the general security, the claim 
or want of civilized society to be secure from those acts or courses of con-
duct that threaten its existence," which includes "peace and order," "the 
general health," "the security of acquisitions" and "the security of transac-
tions"; 2, "the security of social institutions," "domestic, religious and polit-
ical"; 3, "the conservation of social resources," which seems to include nat-
ural resources, whether privately owned or not; 4, "the general morals, the 
claim or want of civilized society to be secure against those acts and courses 
of conduct which run counter to the moral sentiment of the general body 
of those who live therein for the time being." It is not clear that this group 
may not be distributed under the other groups; but it is perhaps worth while, 
pragmatically, to catalogue separately the demand that law shall not be out 
of harmony with popular sentiments generally. The author has elsewhere 
indicated that not all moral principles are to be turned into legal rules (pp. 
43-44) ; 5, "general progress," "economic, political and cultural." This group 
must remain some"'.hat nebulous until the social scientists or the philoso-
phers give us a definition of "progress." Dean Pound probably means to 
include such things as freedom of speech and of scientific research; 6, "the 
social interest in the individual human life, the claim or want of civilized 
soeiety that each individual therein be able to live a human life according 
to the standards of the society." This interest is different from the indi-
vidual's interest in his own life. It would seem to postulate the general 
prevalence of an altruistic social philosophy. 
Individual interests are not included in this enumeration; apparently 
they are to be secured only in so far as they may happen to coincide with 
or run parallel to a social interest (p. 203). This subordination of indi-
vidual interests is fundamentally opposed to the conclusion reached by all 
the dominant nineteenth-century schools of legal philosophy, since each of 
these, whatever its pn;mises, finally arrived at the view that the object of 
law was to secure a maximum of individual self-assertion (p. 151). 
Dean Pound gives a number of examples in which he contrasts the 
nineteenth-century way of looking at specific legal problems with the method 
of sociological jurisprudence (pp. 196-203). The method advocated is the 
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balancing of interests. "The criterion actually employed is the one pro-
posed by William James as a principle of ethical philosophy-'since all 
demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world,' our aim should 
be 'to satisfy as many as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands'" 
(p. 199). This method seems essentially the same as that advocated by 
two leading Continental writers of the sociological school, Ehrlich and Kan-
torowicz. Dean Pound adopts the pragmatic ethics. But pragmatism is 
eclectic, a method rather than a system of philosophy. How are we to know 
which interests to protect and which to sacrifice? Surely it is not to be 
determined by a mathematical formula; we cannot count interests as we 
count votes, and adopt that solution of a problem which has a numerical 
majority of interests in its favor. The author here appears to rely upon 
Kohler's "jural postulates of civilization" (p. 82), for he emphasizes fre-
quently "the existence of civilized society" as the fundamental thing to be 
protected (pp. 2o8, 201). Perhaps it is a virtue rather than a defect of 
sociological jurisprudence that it has no definite philosophical premises, no 
1¥ eltanscltaumtg. In many of the examples given by Dean Pound the solu-
tion, once we catalogue the interests involved, will appear fairly certain, 
whatever one's social philosophy may be. For the more doubtful cases, the 
sociological jurist is in a position to accept the conclusions of sociologists, 
if they have any. 
So far as the present volume goes, the method put forth is that of bal-
ancing interests by intuition or on the basis of casual observation. Obviously, 
in balancing interests we are not to consider merely the individual case, but 
to treat it in terms of universal principles. The social interest in Jean Val 
Jean's existence must be secured in some other way than by sacrificing the 
universal social interest in the security of acquisitions as represented in the 
ownership of the loaf of bread. Yet even so, the method, if it is to be 
used as an instrument of constructive advancement rather than as an expla-
nation of what has already happened, seems too subjective in its present 
shape to be an enduring criterion of legal rules and doctrines in a scientific 
age. The program of the sociological school includes a more exact plan of 
progress through cooperation between jurists and social scientists, whereby 
the former ·will adopt the scientific conclusions of the latter. How is this 
plan to be worked out? Where are we to get the trained investigators to 
carry out this program, and how are their results to be made available to 
the judge, the lawyer, and the legislator? Must the law lag behind until 
the sociologists' conclusions become axiomatic, or may we allow an elective 
judiciary, making, finding, interpreting, and applying the law by the method 
of judicial empiricism (Chapter VII), to balance social interests by the 
method of casual observation? 
These and many other problems the author leaves unsolved. Ten years 
have passed since Dean Pound annoum;ed his treatise on sociological juris-
prudence. The present volume-brilliant, erudite, stimulating, though it is-
is not a fulfillment of that promise, which is yet to be redeemed. 
State University of Iowa, College of Law. EDWIN W. PA'!"l'ERSON. 
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Tm: Hrs'l'ORY oF CONSPIRACY AND .ABUSE oF LEGAL PROCEDURE. By Pe~cy H. 
'II/infield. Cambridge: The University Press. 1921. Pp. xxvii, 219. 
This is the first volume of a series to be issued under the general title, 
Cambridge Studies in English Legal History, edited by Harold D. Hazeltine, 
Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. 
The series will include two kinds of studies, monographs and editions of 
texts, this being the first of the monographs. The editor e..'Cpresses the hope 
that two volumes a year may be is.sued. 
A reading of the present volume confirms the editor's foreword that the 
work consolidates the results of years of painstaking, skilful and learned 
research. No statement in it goes unsupported by careful reference notes, 
so that a great wealth of original material has been collected and marshalled 
in the most available form. -
The subject is one which carries the reader into unfamiliar fields, for 
it has never before been carefully investigated; but while many of the forms 
of abuse of legal procedure which the book discusses are no longer of prac-
tical importance, they present a most fascinating and dramatic picture o; 
the long struggle of society to prevent legal institutions from playing into 
the hands of oppressors. We complain of our courts and their processes as 
slow, needlessly technical and lacking in operative efficiency, and we often _ 
feel that these qualities give wealthy suitors an indirect advantage over 
others, but we do not observe any widespread tendency on the part of pred-
atory individuals or classes to deliberately employ the machinery of the 
courts for inflicting unlawful injury or obtaining unlawful advantages. 
Outside of the highly controversial question of injunctive relief in labor 
disputes, and barring epidemics of police persecution, the resort to the courts 
is generally conceded to be legitimate. Purely oppressive use of legal proc-
esses is comparatively rare. 
But this was not always true, as the book under review amply proves. 
One is amazed at the panorama which the author presents of conspiracies 
confederacies, maintenance, false accusations, frivolous and vexatious liti-
gation, champerty, embracery, barratry and malicious arrests. His chief 
interest is the scope and development of the remedies for these abuses. 
The great remedy, the writ of conspiracy, he believes did not exist at com-
mon law, but originated in the Statute of Conspiritors in zo and 21 Edward 
I. It was usually employed in cases of false accusations of crime, but it 
was sometimes brought "against land-grabbers who would snatch with the 
law's hands that form of property which then epitomized wealth and power." 
"The story of what justifies conspiracy in its old sense is the story of a 
long struggle to solve the legal puzzle of punishing the rogue who would 
kill and rob with the law's own weapons without at the same time terrifying 
the honest accuser or plaintiff." "The law at times seems to barricade its 
windows against light and air, and to leave its doors unlocked to rascals." 
Eventually the writ, like most of those in the ancient register, became too 
rigid and gave place to the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy. 
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Punishment for conspiracy was savagely severe, but "crime was rife in 
high places." "In 1330 a sweeping provision of the King and Council 
requires all the sheriffs of England to be removed and not to be received 
back, and good people and sages of the law to be assigned throughout all 
England to inquire, hear and determine, at the suit of both King and party, 
conspiracies, oppressions, grievances and trespasses made between 1 Edward 
II and 4 Edward III by sheriffs, coroners, constables, bailiffs, hundredors 
and such other ministers and others." The judgment was that they should 
not thereafter be put on juries, that their lands, goods and chattels should 
be seized by the King, that their trees should be uprooted and their bodies 
imprisoned. Sometimes the punishment was by branding in the face and 
slitting the nose, and sometimes by loss of ears, pillory, whipping and fine. 
But the writ of conspiracy was itself perverted, and although it was designed 
to stop false accusations it became a means for stifling honest ones. The 
ordinary courts proved inadequate to cope with the evil, and only with the 
establishment of the Star Chamber was the crime .of conspiracy "withered 
at its root." 
Maintenance and champerty are traced through the early records in the 
same way. Coke believed that they were offenses at common law, but the 
author doubts this. Statutes began to be enacted in 3 Edward I, and were 
at first directed against the King's officers on account of the corruption so 
common among them. Maintainers and barrators became a universal pest, 
and "king after king tried to extirpate them, but never wholly succeeded." 
"At one moment the King, his Council and Parliament are giving remedies 
against these offences. At the next he and they are committing them." 
"Champerty and maintenance were wide spread over the kingdom, but at· 
times were so virulent in particular districts as to call for special measures." 
Here again the Star Cha,mber proved the salvation of the people from the 
threatened deluge of corruption. 
The history of the punishments for these and similar offenses against 
legal procedure casts a particularly interesting light upon our own problem 
of punishment for crime. The author points out that "wherever we find in 
the mediaeval statute-book a batch of exceptionally harsh statutes, we can 
nearly always infer that there were at that period a feeble or absentee King 
and a lawless baronage. It is a mark of such times that the punishments 
for many of the worst crimes against public order are in theory tremendous, 
and that the laws which fix them are little more than a dead letter owing 
to the venality or weakness of those charged with their execution." We 
would show a truer historical understanding if, instead of advocating heavier 
penalties for crime, we made the administration of the criminal law more 
swift and sure. 
The book is prepared with such conscientious precision that the author 
seems deliberately to abstain from a natural inclination toward the imagina-
tive and picturesque allusions and side-lights which so often grace the pages 
of Pollock and Maitland. But while requiring close reading it is by no 
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means dull, and is undoubtedly a contribution of the highest importance in 
its field. Such a volume is a positive inspiration to the reader of legal his-
tory, who so often has to choose between stupid thoroughness and lively 
superficiality. 
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND. 
GoVERN:MENTAL CONTROL AND OPERATION OF INDUSTRY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND 
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE vVoRLD WAR. By Charles Whiting 
Baker. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. vii, 138. 
On the whole, Mr. Baker's book is a defense of the government's con-
trol of industry during the war. Perhaps we are not far enough removed 
from the events to expect an entirely impartial discussion of such a contro-
versial question. Some students, however, have more nearly approximated 
this desirable end. The tone of the book is generally temperate and the 
author is not insensible to the faults of government administration, but 
there is an evident tendency to subordinate these faults. Most fair-minded 
people will probably agree with the author that, looking at the broad results 
attained and bearing in mind the immensity of the problems and the urgency 
of immediate decisions, the records of government administration in Great 
Britain and the United States were as good as could have been reasonably 
expected. This is the author's thesis and is as well supported as it could 
be in the brief space of 138 pages. The reviewer wonders, however, if Mr. 
Baker has not exaggerated the opposition to his own views in asserting that 
the conservative middle classes "are well-nigh unanimous in condemnation 
of the way the government business was carried on." Does not the senti-
ment shown in the demand for a return of the raifroads to private owner-
ship and for the sale of our government-owned merchant marine to private 
operators merely indicate a belief that the necessities of war-time. and wise 
policy in peace-time call for quite different programs? One feels in reading 
the book that the author is rather missing the point of the present popular 
disapproval of government control of business. 
The book is valuable as a summary statement of the development and 
conduct of government control over industry during the war. There is a 
brief and interesting chapter on the nature of efficiency and on the difficulty 
of its attainment by a government. The author then proceeds seriatim 
through a discussion of government control of railways, public utilities, 
shipping, labor, capital, food, and fuel, and concludes with very brief chap-
ters on the extension of government control in peace-time and the conflict 
between the executive and legislative branches of government. For the gen-
eral reader, perhaps, the value of the book is enhanced by the omission of 
many details which would be desired by the more serious student. 
For the student who is interested in government administration during 
this period, not so much for its own sake as for the principles of adminis-
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tration which it may yield and for the light which it may throw on the 
normal peace-time relation of the state to industry, the book will be less 
satisfying. Without criticising the author for writing a book with another 
purpose, it may be suggested that what is now needed is a study of govern-
ment administration of war activities in general from this latter point of 
view-a book undertaken in a sympathetic mood, giving full credit to the 
men who gave their best efforts to the successful prosecution of the war, 
but concerned primarily with distinguishing between the principles of admin-
istration which were shown to be valid and those which were shown to be 
fundamentally unsound. 
University of Michigan. C. E. GRn'.FIN. 
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